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Abstract
In this paper we examine capital income taxation of a reference dependent sufficiently
loss averse investor in a two period portfolio choice model under full loss offset provisions.
Capital income taxation with loss offset provisions has been found to stimulate risk taking
in expected utility models under certain assumptions about attitudes towards risk but
would such effect be found under prospect theory type of preferences? We observe that
the impact of capital income taxation depends on investors’ reference levels relative to
their endowment income and thus we explore capital income taxation for different types of
loss averse investors in terms of their ambition. We consider the less ambitious investors
to be the ones with relatively low reference levels (they avoid relative losses in both
periods) and more ambitious investors to be those with relatively high reference levels.
We analyze two types of more ambitious investors: investors with higher time preference
(who experience relative losses only in the second period under the bad state of nature)
and investors with lower time preference (who experience relative losses only in the first
period). We observe that capital income taxation stimulates current consumption in
most cases which encourages risk taking, although the final outcome would depend on the
investors’ degree of risk aversion, the rate of time preference and the tax rate in relation to
certain thresholds. Current consumption could be discouraged for some ambitious type
of investors that have relatively high second period reference levels but not necessary
first period reference levels. In summary, to determine the impact of capital income
taxation on the decision variables the reference levels in relation to endowment income
play the most significant role. Ignoring reference depended preferences can lead to different
conclusions for investors reaction to capital income taxation. We also find certain type
∗The authors would like to thank Robert Kunst for very helpful comments that lead to improvement of the
paper. Jaroslava Hlouskova gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Austrian Science Fund FWF
(project number V 438-N32).
of investors whose happiness level increases with capital income taxation under full loss
offset provisions.
Keywords: prospect theory, loss aversion, consumption-savings decision, capital income
tax
JEL classification: G02, G11, H2, E20
1 Introduction
One of the most robust discovery in theoretical public finance has been that a proportional
tax on risky returns with full loss offset will stimulate risk taking contrary to the popular
view that taxes hurt investment activity. This important public policy finding for encouraging
the undertaking of additional risky projects by rational risk averse investors originated from
the seminal work by Domar and Musgrave (1944). With full loss offset, the tax reduces the
return of the risky project but also its riskiness. In the absence of income effects a risk averse
investor reacts to the tax increase by increasing investment in the risky asset in order to
make the distribution of the after-tax return of the asset the same as that prior to taxation.1
This reaction to the tax results in the expected utility remaining unchanged (Mossin, 1968).
In the presence of income effects, Stiglitz (1969) showed that under reasonable attitudes
towards risk, such as nondecreasing relative risk aversion, the encouragement to undertake
more risky projects is still observed from a theoretical perspective. The importance of full loss
offset provision to stimulate risk taking activity has had continued support for more general
formulations (see Ahsan, 1974, 1989; Heaton, 1987; Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger, 1997).
However, this stimulus depends also on how the risk is handled by the public sector. If the
public sector is no more efficient in handling risk, then risk taking will be discouraged with
the tax on risky assets (see Gordon and Wilson, 1989; Ahsan and Tsigaris, 2009). The above
literature uses the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility framework which assumes that
investors are rational; are risk averse (but not loss averse nor risk lovers); they don’t place
more importance to the status quo relative to other outcomes; they don’t compare their
consumption or wealth to a reference level and they have objective (true) information on the
probabilities of outcomes in different states of nature when making decisions (not subjective).
However, in a breakthrough research Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conducted an experiment
which showed that these assumptions are not valid and that a better model to describe such
decisions under risk is prospect theory.2
Henceforth, the objective and main contribution of this research is to consider the re-
sponse of a prospect theory type of investor arising from changes in a proportional capital
income tax rate under full loss offset provisions on risk taking activity and consumption. We
address the following questions for insights into the new approach of the literature on be-
havioural public finance: How would a loss averse and risk concerned (or risk lover) reference
dependent investor react to a change in capital income taxation on risk taking in a two period
consumption portfolio choice model? How does the prospect theory type investor’s behaviour
differ from the above predictions of the traditional public finance approach to these old ques-
tions on risk taking and taxation? Are there any new insights from the new approach which
1This reaction is also observed when the return to the risk-free asset is zero or when the risk-free asset
yields a positive return and the tax is imposed only on the excess return of the risky asset (i.e, on the risk
premium).
2See also Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
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behavioral public finance theory can provide? For example, what additional assumptions will
be needed to be imposed to generate an increased demand for risky assets from an increase
in capital income taxation with full loss offset provisions? Does the investor shift preference
towards current consumption and away from consumption in the future as in the traditional
public finance approach to the old question of inter-temporal decisions from capital income
taxation? Thus, in this paper we examine how in a two period prospect theory type of model
an increase in capital income taxation, under full loss offset, affects a loss averse investor’s
behaviour in terms of: current and future consumption, savings, portfolio choice between a
risk-free and risky assets as well as the happiness as measured by investor’s expected indirect
utility function. To arrive to some new insights a theoretical model developed by Hlouskova,
Fortin and Tsigaris (2017) is used with an introduction of a proportional capital income tax
on the returns to the risk-free and risky asset. Due to the behavioural economics type of pref-
erences, we explore the reaction of prospect theory type investors whose behaviour depends
on where their consumption reference levels are in relation to their endowment income levels.
Hlouskova et al. (2017) show that the optimal solution for consumption and risk taking de-
pends on the loss averse investor’s degree of ambition determined by how the present value
of endowment income differs from the present value of reference levels.
There have been experimental studies which attempt to analyze the effects of taxation
on risk taking activity (see among others, Swenson, 1989; King and Wallin, 1990; Acker-
mann, Fochmann and Mihm, 2013; Blaufus et al., 2013; Fochmann, Kiesewetter and Sadrieh,
2012; Fochmann, Hemmerich and Kiesewetter, 2016; Fochmann et al., 2017; Fochmann and
Hemmerich, 2017). Most of these experimental studies reach different conclusions from the
theoretical literature and some support the popular view that taxes hurt risky investment
even when full loss offset provisions are in place. Swenson (1989) and King and Wallin (1990)
find, without accounting for behavioural biases, that a proportional tax with full loss offset
will not have a significant effect on risk taking. On the other hand, Fochmann and Hemmerich
(2017) and Fochmann et al. (2017) find in their experimental studies that a proportional in-
come tax, even with full loss offset, results in a significant reduction in risk taking. They
attribute this behavior to perceptual tax biases (not to rational tax effects) and explain such
a negative reaction to the tax due to the investor’s high cognitive load for solving complex
problems. According to Fochmann and Hemmerich (2017) this reaction is consistent with
Ackermann, Fochmann and Mihm (2013) who show that a reduction in the complexity of the
problem posed on the subjects reduces the tax biases. It is also consistent with Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) if the gross return is part of the reference level and with Thaler (1985)
who provides explanation due to mental accounting.3 There has also been some theoretical
work on the effects of capital income taxation under prospect theory type of preferences (see
Hlouskova and Tsigaris, 2012; Hlouskova et al., 2014; Mehrmann and Sureth-Sloane, 2017).
3The effects of tax on risk taking due to behavioural biases were studied in earlier work of Fochmann,
Kiesewetter and Sadrieh (2012) who had reached the opposite conclusion.
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Mehrmann and Sureth-Sloane (2017) find that tax loss offsets restrictions affect negatively
investment in risky assets. Results from a one period model of Hlouskova and Tsigaris (2012)
indicate that it is possible for a capital income tax increase not to stimulate risk taking (i.e.,
investing into a risky asset) even if the tax code provides attractive full loss offset provisions.
This depends on how that tax affects the reference level and hence how it is perceived by
investors. Risk taking can increase if the investor interprets part of the tax as a loss instead
as a reduced gain. In this case the investor becomes risk seeking and responds by increasing
total and private risk taking.
This new behavioural economics approach to the old questions of the field of public finance
finds that investors that are driven by a self-enhancement motive (i.e., have relatively low ref-
erence levels) will have their present value of endowment income higher than the present value
of their consumption reference levels. These investors are considered as less ambitious and
in the limiting case represent investors who have expected utility preferences. Their optimal
decisions are such that they manage to avoid relative losses from occurring in both periods.4
Risk taking, future consumption and investors’ expected indirect utility (happiness) are pos-
itively related to the first period optimal consumption relative to its reference level. Within
the less ambitious investors we explore the effect of the tax for three subcases depending on
where the reference level is in relation to the endowment income of the same period and/or
in relation to the endowment income and reference level of the other period. These investors
react to a capital income taxation in such a way that they continue to avoid relative losses in
all subcases. To the extent that the capital income tax stimulates current consumption which
most likely will occur with such a tax in most cases examined but not all, this contributes
towards encouraging risk taking although the final outcome depends on various thresholds for
the risk aversion parameter, the tax rate and the rate of time preference. A sufficiently high
risk aversion will stimulate risk taking for the less ambitious investors, while those that are
relatively less risk averse, combined with a lower tax rate and relatively impatient, increased
taxation will discourage risk taking even with full loss offset provisions.5 It is worth noting
that when the first period reference level exceeds the endowment income in that period and
the second period reference level is below the second period reference level (i.e., the investor
is relatively more ambitious in the first than the second period) the tax increase results in a
happier investor as measured by the indirect utility function. The same feature is observed
also for investors whose both reference levels are below their corresponding endowment income
under certain conditions such as being relatively impatient to consume in the future.
On the other hand, investors that are driven by a self-improvement motive have higher
reference levels than endowment income in present value. These investors find optimal solu-
4Relative losses occur when consumption is under the corresponding reference level.
5Students as subjects used in experimental studies could be of the relatively impatient type which may
explain why risk taking falls with a tax under full loss offset provisions as in Fochmann and Hemmerich
(2017).
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tions such that they cannot avoid relative losses in either the second period in the bad state
of nature if they are relatively impatient or in the first period to avoid relative losses in the
future if they are relatively more patient to consume in the future relative to the present.
We label these investors as more ambitious investors and explore the effect of capital income
taxation for three subcases depending on the relations among reference levels and endowment
incomes. For ambitious but impatient investors we find that in most cases reaction to capital
income taxation is to reduce losses in the bad state of nature. In all three subcases the tax
stimulates risk taking. Surprisingly in two out of three cases the tax increases the investor’s
happiness level.
For more ambitious but also relatively patient investors the reaction of the capital income
taxation, in cases where the second period reference level is higher than the respective en-
dowment income, is to increase relative losses in the first period further. The impact on risk
taking is similar to the case of a less ambitious household in that risk aversion and tax rate
have to be higher then some thresholds to stimulate risk taking. It is again worth mentioning
that an investor with relative high first period reference level but not a second period will be
happier with the tax increase.
In section 2 the model set-up is presented. This is followed with section 3 where the
impact of capital income tax on less ambitious investors is analyzed. In section 4 we examine
the more ambitious investors with a higher rate of time preference and those with a lower
rate of time preference. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model set-up
In a two period life cycle model an investor has a non-stochastic first period exogenous labor
income, Y1 > 0, which it can allocate to current consumption, C1, risk-free investment, m,
and risky investment, α ≥ 0, where the sum of the risky and risk-free investment are savings
S. Thus, in the first period
Y1 = C1 +m+ α = C1 + S (1)
Let τ ∈ (0, 1) represents capital income tax. We consider two assets, a risk-free asset with a
net after tax return (1− τ)rf > 0 and a risky asset with stochastic after tax return (1− τ)rg
in the good state of nature, which occurs with probability p, 0 < p < 1, and with after tax
return (1− τ)rb < 0, in the bad state of nature, which occurs with probability 1− p. To ease
the exposition, let us introduce the following notation
r¯f = (1− τ)rf
r¯s =
{
r¯g = (1− τ)rg if s = g
r¯b = (1− τ)rb if s = b
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We assume that
−1 < rb < 0 ≤ rf < rg (2)
which implies that also after tax returns follow the same inequality, namely: −1 < r¯b <
0 ≤ r¯f < r¯g. Finally, we assume that E(r) = p rg + (1 − p)rb > rf . This implies that also
E(r¯) = p r¯g + (1− p)r¯b > r¯f .
In the second period the investor consumes
C2s =
{
(1 + r¯f )m+ (1 + r¯g)α + Y2 if s = g
(1 + r¯f )m+ (1 + r¯b)α+ Y2 if s = b
where Y2 ≥ 0 is the non-stochastic income in the second period and s ∈ {b, g}. Note that
C2g ≥ C2b as α ≥ 0 and r¯g > r¯b, where C2g is the second period investor’s consumption in the
good state of nature and C2b in the bad state of nature. The investor is allowed to consume
the non stochastic future income Y2 in the first period, as long as consumption exceeds zero
in either period and savings are negative. Hence, the investor can partially borrow from the
risk-free asset m against its future income. The earnings from total investments are equal to
(1+ r¯f )m+(1+ r¯s)α, s ∈ {b, g}. Based on this and (1) the consumption in the second period
is
C2s =
{
(1 + r¯f ) (Y1 −C1) + (r¯g − r¯f )α+ Y2 if s = g
(1 + r¯f ) (Y1 −C1) + (r¯b − r¯f )α+ Y2 if s = b
(3)
The investor’s preferences are described by the following reference based utility function
U(C1, α) = V (C1 − C¯1) + δ V (C2 − C¯2) (4)
where C¯1 and C¯2 are exogenous consumption reference (or comparison) levels, such that
max
{
C¯1, C¯2
}
< Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
, δ is the discount factor, 0 < δ < 1, and V (·) is a prospect theory
(S-shaped) value function defined as
V (Ci − C¯i) =

(Ci−C¯i)
1−γ
1−γ , Ci ≥ C¯i
−λ (C¯i−Ci)
1−γ
1−γ , Ci < C¯i
 (5)
for i = 1, 2. Parameter λ > 1 is the loss aversion parameter and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter
determining the curvature of the utility function. If consumption is above the reference level
there are (relative) gains, if consumption is below the reference level there are (relative) losses.
The utility has a kink at the consumption reference level and it is steeper for losses than for
gains, i.e., a decrease in consumption is more severely penalized in the domain of losses than
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in the domain of gains. Finally, the utility function is concave above the reference point
and convex below it. The investor is thus risk averse in the domain of gains (i.e., above
the consumption reference level) and risk seeking in the domain of losses (i.e., below the
consumption reference level), see Figure 1.
(relative) gains(relative) losses consumption
S-shaped value function
reference level on consumption
Figure 1: Prospect theory (S-shaped) value function
The investor maximizes the following expected utility as given by (4) and (5)
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) = V (C1 − C¯1) + δ EV (C2 − C¯2)
such that : C1 ≥ 0, C2b ≥ 0 and α ≥ 0
Based on this and (3) the investor’s maximization problem can be formulated as follows
Max(C1,α) : E(U(C1, α)) = V (C1 − C¯1)
+ δ EV
(
(1 + r¯f ) (Y1 − C1) + Y2 + (r¯s − r¯f )α− C¯2
)
such that : 0 ≤ C1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−(r¯f−r¯b)α
1+r¯f
,
0 ≤ α ≤
(1+r¯f)Y1+Y2
r¯f−r¯b

(6)
Note that the upper bound on C1 follows from C2b ≥ 0 and the upper bound on α follows
from the imposition of the upper bound on C1 exceeding zero, i.e. Y1+
Y2−(r¯f−r¯b)α
1+r¯f
≥ 0. The
condition on α means that short sales are not allowed.
8
As a measure of the riskiness of future consumption (also known as private risk taking)
we also introduce the standard deviation of the second period consumption of the investor
σC2 = (1− τ)ασr = (1− τ)α
√
p(1− p)(rg − rb) (7)
where σr is the standard deviation of the return of the risky asset, namely, σr =
√
p(1− p)(rg−
rb).
3 Less ambitious investors
In this section, we explore an investor with a present value of endowment income greater than
or equal to the present value of reference consumption levels, Y1 +
Y2
1+r¯f
≥ C¯1 +
C¯2
1+r¯f
, where
the discount rate is the after tax return to the risk-free asset. This will be expressed as
Ω¯ =
[
Y1 +
Y2
1 + r¯f
−
(
C¯1 +
C¯2
1 + r¯f
)]
≥ 0 (8)
Hlouskova et al. (2017) consider such an investor to be driven by a self enhancement motive.
This motive makes the investor feel good and thus could increase his/her self-esteem. For
example, the investor, to feel good, could be comparing the present value of his/her wealth
with others of lower economic status and also could be attempting to maintain this relative
position in society. This is possible by equating the present value of the reference consump-
tion levels to the present value of endowment income of investors with the lower economic
status. Another example would be when the investor abolishes the reference levels and makes
his/her choices based on the expected utility model. The less ambitious investor is inter-
ested in avoiding relative losses6 in both periods and decides on consumption and risk taking
accordingly.
Based on Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017), the solution for a sufficiently loss averse
investor of preferences given by (6) becomes
C∗1 = C¯1 +
Ω¯
1 + M¯1+r¯f
(9)
α∗ =
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
×
M¯
1− τ
×
Ω¯
1 + M¯1+r¯f
=
(
1−K
1
γ
0
)
rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
×
M¯
1− τ
×
(
C∗1 − C¯1
)
(10)
6Throughout the paper ‘relative losses’ will refer to the consumption below the corresponding reference
level while ‘relative gains’ will refer to the consumption above the corresponding reference level.
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where K0 and M¯ are given by (30) and (35). The optimal solution of current consumption
relative to its reference level depends positively on the present value of endowment income net
of the present value of consumption reference levels, Ω¯. If Ω¯ > 0, then current consumption
will exceed its reference level resulting in relative gains in the first period, while if Ω¯ = 0 then
current consumption will equal to the first period reference level. The fraction of Ω¯ in (9),
namely 1
1+ M¯
1+r¯f
, is investor’s marginal propensity to consume (MPC) which is the increase
in consumption in the first period from a unit increase in the present value of endowment
income keeping the reference levels constant.7 The sufficiently loss averse investor will invest
a fraction of this relative gain in the risky asset. Furthermore, it can be shown that optimal
second period consumption in the good and in bad state of nature will also exceed the second
period reference level resulting in relative gains also in the second period, see (46) and (47) in
the appendix. Second period consumption also increases when current relative gains increase.
Thus, the investor is avoiding relative losses from occurring in either period and in any state of
nature that materializes in the second period. Also of note is that the loss aversion parameter
is not part of the optimal decisions because relative losses are avoided.8
3.1 Capital income taxation for the less ambitious investors
Next we show the impact of an increase in capital income taxation on the decision variables
under three different cases assuming that the present value of endowment income exceeds
the present value of reference consumption levels (Ω¯ > 0).9 First, when the first period
consumption reference level is below the first period endowment income and the second period
consumption reference level is below the second period endowment income, i.e., when C¯1 <
Y1 and C¯2 < Y2. Second, when the first period consumption reference level exceeds the
first period endowment income while the second period reference level is below the second
period endowment income such that the present value of endowment income is in the excess
to the present value of consumption reference levels, i.e., when C¯1 > Y1, C¯2 < Y2 and
Y1 +
Y2
1+rf
−
(
C¯1 +
C¯2
1+rf
)
> 0. In this case the investor is relatively more ambitious in the
first period than in the second period. Third, when the first period consumption reference
level is below the first period endowment income, C¯1 < Y1, but the second period reference
level exceeds the second period endowment income, C¯2 > Y2 while Y1 + Y2 > C¯1 + C¯2 and
thus investor is relatively more ambitious in the second period than in the first period..
7Note that marginal propensity to consume of less ambitious investor is less than one.
8However the solution can be found only for a sufficient loss averse investor. For more details in this matter,
see Hlouskova et al. (2017).
9The differentiation of results (consumption, investment in the risky asset, private risk taking and the
indirect utility function) with respect to the tax rate is presented the appendix, see (54)-(60).
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3.1.1 Case 1: C¯1 < Y1, C¯2 < Y2
In the case of low reference levels in both periods, we find that an increase in capital income
taxation will increase current consumption, see (54), and reduce second period consumption in
both states of nature, see (57) and (58). An increase in capital income taxation increases the
price of future consumption, stimulating current consumption, and thus also current relative
gains, as it is cheaper at the expense of future consumption. This effect can be seen as an
increase in investor’s marginal propensity to consume, i.e., the tax increases MPC= 1
1+ M¯
1+r¯f
,
while keeping Ω¯ constant, see (9) and (53). Since the second period reference level is below
the second period endowment income, the tax also increases Ω¯, keeping the MPC constant,
see (49).10 Thus, this income effect also increases first period consumption and thus reinforces
the increase in consumption due to the substitution effect (i.e., the increase in MPC).
In terms of future consumption there are two opposite effects operating since relative
gains in the second period are proportional to relative gains in the first period, see (46) and
(47). The increase in the tax makes future consumption more expensive and thus the investor
reduces the proportion allocated to the relative gains in the second period keeping the first
period relative gains constant but this is partially offset since the tax increases relative gains
in the first period and thus increasing second period relative gains. However, when both
reference levels are below their respective income levels the former effect is stronger than
the latter one reducing future consumption in both states of nature.11 In spite of this, the
investor will still make relative gains in the second period in both, good and bad, states of
nature but not as much as it would have made without the capital income tax.
As seen in (10) the investment in the risky asset is proportional to the relative gain in
the first period. The increase in the capital income tax affects the proportionality factor
M¯
1−τ , keeping relative gains in the first period constant, and it affects the relative gains in the
first period as described above, keeping constant the proportionality factor. There are two
effects on the proportionality factor. The first effect is the Domar-Musgrave phenomenon
where due to loss offset provisions the investor increases the risky asset in such a way that
private risk taking remains unaffected. This effect is α
∗
1−τ , see (55). The second effect is a
negative one which reduces the Domar-Musgrave effect and can make it negative. This effect
is − α
∗
1−τ
r¯f
γ(1+r¯f )
, see again (55).12 These two effects compose the impact of the tax on the
proportionality factor making the overall impact of the tax ambiguous. On the other hand,
the increase in the tax also increases the relative gains in the first period consumption, keeping
10Ω¯ increases, as increasing tax rate reduces the discount rate increases the discount factor 1
1+r¯f
and thus
the present value of endowment income net of the reference levels (also in present value) as C¯2 < Y2.
11See (50), (57) and (58) in the appendix.
12Note that if the tax was imposed only on the excess returns of the risky asset, i.e., r¯f = rf and r¯s =
rf +(1− τ )(rs− rf ), s ∈ {g, b}, then there would be only the Domar-Musgrave effect. The negative impact on
the proportion would be absent, see also (51). Thus, in this case for C2s = (1+rf )(Y1−C1)+(1−τ )(rs−rf )α+Y2
this would be a capital income tax which exempts the safe interest earned from total savings S = Y1 − C1.
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constant the proportionality factor, and thus enhances the positive effect of the capital income
tax on the investment in the risky asset.
Thus, a sufficient condition for risk taking to increase with increasing tax rate is that
both effects (on the proportionality factor and on current relative gains) move in the same
positive direction. This occurs when τ exceeds its threshold value τ¯ = 1 − γ(1−γ)rf (i.e., for
τ > τ¯), see (51) and (55). As for γ ≥
rf
1+rf
is τ¯ ≤ 0 and thus for sufficiently risk averse
investors investment in the risky asset increases when capital income tax increases for all
τ . In summary, for less risk-averse investors, i.e., when γ <
rf
1+rf
, investment in the risky
asset increases with increasing τ when τ > τ¯ , which is sufficient (not necessary) condition for
dα∗
dτ > 0. For τ < τ¯ (and thus for γ <
rf
1+rf
, to keep τ¯ positive) the impact of taxation on risk
taking is ambiguous (i.e., risk taking can be both increasing or decreasing with increasing tax
rate). However, sufficient condition for risk taking to decrease with increasing tax rate is that
τ does not exceed certain threshold, namely when τ < τ¯2 = 1−
γ(1+M)
(1−2γ)rf
, if investor is not too
risk averse, i.e., γ <
rf
1+2rf
and has sufficiently high time preference (see Table 1).
The indirect utility function (happiness) is positively affected by the increase in relative
gains in the first period but this is offset by the reduction in relative consumption in the second
period in both states of nature. The tax will increase Ω¯ which will increase happiness but
the tax also increases the marginal propensity to consume distorting inter-temporal decisions
away from future consumption which reduces happiness as measured by the indirect utility
function (see (48)). Hence there is ambiguity with respect to the impact of the tax on the
indirect utility. However, it can be shown that the sign of the impact of the tax on the indirect
utility depends on the level of the tax rate relative to threshold level τ¯1, see (59) and (61),
where τ¯1 is given by (40). The indirect utility function is decreasing (with increasing tax rate)
when τ < τ¯1, is increasing (with increasing τ) when τ > τ¯1, and is neutral with changing τ
when τ = τ¯1. It is intuitive that for a sufficiently small δ is τ¯1 < 0 (i.e., in the case of very
impatient investors who have a very high rate of time preference) is the indirect utility an
increasing function of τ since importance is placed on the increase in the first period relative
gains in consumption than in the reduction in second period relative gains. Hence, there is
a stronger positive effect of current relative consumption from a higher tax on the indirect
utility than a negative effect of the future relative consumption for investors with sufficiently
large time preference (i.e., for sufficiently small δ). In this case, a higher capital income tax
will make the investor happier.13
Even though risk taking might increase with increasing capital income taxation the stan-
dard deviation of future consumption (private risk taking) is a decreasing function in τ . This
occurs because the direct impact of the capital income taxation on reducing volatility of fu-
ture consumption is stronger than the indirect impact on volatility from a potential increase
13The following holds based on (59): happiness level is increasing with increasing tax rate if in the limit
C¯1 = Y1 but C¯2 < Y2. On the other hand, if C¯1 < Y1 and in the limit C¯2 = Y2 then happiness level is
decreasing with increasing tax rate.
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in risk taking activity. The summary can be found at the top part of Table 1.14
3.1.2 Case 2: Y1 < C¯1 < Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
and C¯2 < Y2
The second case of a less ambitious investor we consider is when the first period reference
level exceeds the first period income and the second period reference level is below the second
period exogenous income. This is a investor who is relatively more ambitious in the first than
in the second period.
An increase in capital income taxation will stimulate current consumption and discourage
total savings as in case 1. However, second period consumption in the bad and good state
could be stimulated in this case. This happens if the first period reference level is above
threshold C¯U1 , i.e., when investor is sufficiently ambitious in the first period and he/she is also
relatively averse to risk, i.e., when γ ≥
rf
1+rf
. Also risk taking will increase with a relatively
high aversion to risk, i.e., when γ ≥
rf
1+2rf
. The standard deviation of future consumption (i.e.,
private risk taking) can increase also when the first period reference level is above threshold
C¯U1 and investor is also relatively risk averse. However, future consumption in the bad and
good states could be discouraged by capital income taxation if the first period reference level
is below threshold C¯L1 and the investor is relatively impatient (to consume in the future). In
this case risk taking could be also discouraged if the investor is relatively impatient, the tax
rate is below a certain threshold level, and diminishing sensitivity aversion to risk is relatively
low.
A surprising result is that an increase in capital income taxation increases the indirect
utility in this case. As in the previous case, the capital income tax increases Ω¯ which increases
happiness which is partially offset by the increase in the marginal propensity to consume
1
1+ M¯
1+rf
, see (48). However, the offset is not strong enough due to the first period reference
level exceeding the first period income, leading to an increase in happiness, (see (59) in the
appendix).15
3.1.3 Case 3: C¯1 < Y1 and Y2 < C¯2 < Y1 − C¯1 + Y2
In the final case, the first period reference level is lower than the investor’s first period income
but the second period reference level is higher than the second period endowment income.
An example would be if the investor did not have second period endowment income. We still
consider this investor as less ambitious in that it avoids relative losses but has a relatively
high second period reference level to the second period endowment income. We say that this
investor is relatively more ambitious in the second period than the first period.
14Note that the solution for C¯1 = Y1 and C¯2 = Y2 is the following: C
∗
1 = Y1, C
∗
2b = C
∗
2g = Y2, α
∗ = 0,
σC∗
2
= 0, S∗ = 0, C∗1 , E(U
∗) = 0 and thus does not depend on the tax.
15For more detailed explanation, see the middle part of Table 1 as well as its caption where the threshold
levels of the tax rate, degree of risk aversion and time preference are presented.
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Capital income taxation has the same directional effects as in the first case for all decision
variables except for current consumption which now is ambiguous while in the first and
second cases current consumption is stimulated by capital income tax. The impact on current
consumption depends on the second period reference level. If the second period reference level
is below threshold C¯L2 then the current consumption is stimulated but if the second period
reference exceeds a higher threshold level C¯U2 then the current consumption is discouraged
by capital income tax increase.16 In terms of risk taking similar pattern is observed as in the
first case except that the thresholds for the risk aversion parameter γ to stimulate risk taking
has changed as well as the thresholds of the capital income tax and risk aversion in the case
when an increase in capital income taxation discourages risk taking. Finally, the increase in
capital income taxation reduces happiness as measured by the indirect utility, see (59). For
summary of the results, see the bottom part of Table 1.
4 More ambitious investors
We now consider a sufficiently loss averse investor who has relatively high consumption refer-
ence levels.17 By high reference levels we mean that the present value of endowment income
is lower than the present value of consumption reference levels, where the discount rate is
the after tax return to the risk-free asset, i.e., Y1 +
Y2
1+r¯f
< C¯1 +
C¯2
1+r¯f
and thus Ω¯ < 0, see
(8). This investor is thus more ambitious and has higher aspirations which could be due to
the self-improvement motive when trying to reach an ambitious target. For example, the in-
vestor compares its present value of endowment income (discounted by the return of after tax
risk-free asset) with income of investors of higher economic status by taking his/her present
value of consumption reference level to be equal to the present value of endowment income
of a richer investor. Thus, to self-improve, the investor makes an upward comparison instead
of downward comparison as in the less ambitious investor case previously examined. The
ambitious investor is interested to catch up to the richer investor’s wealth and as a result will
not avoid relative losses from occurring.
There are two cases to consider: an investor with relatively higher time preference when
δ ≤ δ¯ (less patient investor) and investor with relatively lower time preference when δ > δ¯
(more patient investor) where the threshold value for δ is defined as follows
δ¯ = δ¯(τ) =
1
1− p
[
rg − rf
(1 + (1− τ) rf ) (rg − rb)
]1−γ
(11)
16It is easy to see that C¯L2 < C¯
U
2 .
17For more detailed conditions on sufficiently large loss aversion parameter λ, see Hlouskova, Fortin and
Tsigaris (2017), Proposition 3, equations (20)-(23). Note that conditions for lower bounds on λ could be easily
derived such that they do not depend on tax rate τ . As the presentation of these conditions is cumbersome we
decided to avoid their explicit statement in this paper. Note that Proposition 3 assumes also an upper bound
on C¯2. This can be handled in a similar way. Supplementary material upon request is available.
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Case 1 C¯1 < Y1 and C¯2 < Y2
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dσC∗
2
dS dE(U∗)
dτ > 0 < 0 < 0 ≷ 0 < 0 < 0 ≷ 0
> 0 > 0
when when
τ > τ¯ τ > τ¯1
= 0
when
τ = τ¯1
< 0 < 0
when when
τ < τ¯2 τ < τ¯1
γ <
rf
1+2rf
δ <
˜˜
δ
Case 2 Y1 < C¯1 < Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+rf
and C¯2 < Y2
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dσC∗
2
dS dE(U∗)
dτ > 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 < 0 > 0
> 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
when when when when
C¯1 > C¯
U
1 C¯1 > C¯
U
1 γ ≥
rf
1+2rf
C¯1 > C¯
U
1
γ ≥
rf
1+rf
γ ≥
rf
1+rf
γ ≥
rf
1+rf
< 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
when when when when
C¯1 < C¯
L
1 C¯1 < C¯
L
1 τ < τ¯4 C¯1 < C¯
L
1
δ < δ˜ δ < δ˜ γ < γ3 δ < δ˜
δ < δ˜
Case 3 C¯1 < Y1 and Y2 < C¯2 < Y1 − C¯1 + Y2
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dσC∗
2
dS dE(U∗)
dτ ≷ 0 < 0 < 0 ≷ 0 < 0 ≷ 0 < 0
> 0 > 0 < 0
when when when
C¯2 < C¯
L
2 γ ≥ γ1 C¯2 < C¯
L
2
< 0 < 0 > 0
when when when
C¯2 > C¯
U
2 τ < τ¯3 C¯2 > C¯
U
2
γ < γ2
δ < δ˜
Table 1: Sensitivity results with respect to τ for less ambitious investor. Notation: τ¯ , τ¯1, τ¯2, τ¯3,
τ¯4, γ1, γ2, γ3, C¯
L
1 , C¯
U
1 , C¯
L
2 , C¯
U
2 , δ˜ and
˜˜
δ are given by (39), (40), (41), (42), (43), (22), (23), (24),
(16), (17), (18), (19), (20) and (21) in the glossary. Note that under assumptions of stated cases the
following holds: τ¯ > τ¯2,
rf
1+2rf
> γ3, γ1 > γ2, C¯
U
1 > C¯
L
1 and C¯
U
2 > C¯
L
2 .
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Note that the threshold of the time preference, δ¯, depends on the tax rate and is an increasing
function in τ . For sufficiently small δ, namely when δ ≤ δ¯(0), the behavior of the investor is
of the one with relatively higher time preference for any tax rate. And if the probability of
the good state to occur is sufficiently large then only this case is considered.18 Let, on the
other hand, p be sufficiently small (see (71) in the appendix) such that δ¯(0) < 1 and let, in
addition, δ be sufficiently large, such that δ > δ¯(0). Then for smaller tax rate is investor’s
time preference above its threshold (i.e., δ > δ¯(τ)) and thus behaves as the investor with
relatively lower time preference. When the tax rates exceeds a certain threshold value τ˜ ,19
then investor’s discount factor δ becomes smaller than its threshold for all sufficiently large τ ,
i.e., δ ≤ δ¯(τ) for τ > τ˜ , and thus the investor behaves then as the one with relatively higher
time preference. For more details see the appendix.
We first examine an investor who has a relatively lower discount factor for future utility
of relative consumption. It discounts utility from future consumption at a relatively higher
rate of time preference. For this investor relative losses cannot be avoided in the second
period in the bad state of nature given investment in the risky asset. In the subsequent case,
the ambitious investor has a relatively lower rate of time preference and thus places more
importance in the utility of future consumption (i.e., δ should be sufficiently large). In this
case, the investor will make decisions to avoid relative losses in the second period but at the
sacrifice of making relative losses in the first period. We explore these two cases next starting
from the investor who values current consumption relatively more than future consumption
given the assumed low discount factor for future utility.
4.1 More ambitious investors with a higher time preference
We assume in this subsection that δ ≤ δ¯. For sufficiently loss averse investor the solution is
given by (see Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris, 2017)
C∗1 = C¯1 +
(−Ω¯)
¯M(λ)
1+r¯f
− 1
(12)
α∗ =
[(
1
K0
)1/γ
+ λ1/γ
]
rg − rf
k¯
1− τ
(
C∗1 − C¯1
)
(13)
where M¯(λ) is given by (36) in the glossary. The optimal solution is such that current
consumption is above its reference level, i.e., the relatively impatient and sufficiently loss
averse investor avoids relative losses in the first period. Risky investment is undertaken by
this investor by investing a fraction of the relative gains of the first period. In addition, the
optimal consumption in the second period in the good state of nature will exceed the second
18As in this case is δ¯(0) ≥ 1.
19The threshold value of the tax rate, τ˜ , is such that δ = δ¯(τ˜).
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period reference level but optimal consumption in the bad state of nature will be below the
corresponding reference level, see (74) and (75) in the appendix. Hence, the ambitious investor
cannot avoid losses and as a result the loss averse parameter appears in the solutions. Risk
taking and first period consumption will decrease with increasing loss averse parameter (see
Hlouskova et al., 2017). It is important to note that first period consumption is an inferior
good for this ambitious investor with a higher time preference who is experiencing losses in
the bad state of nature. A marginal increase in the present value of endowment income will
reduce the first period consumption by 1M¯(λ)
1+r¯f
−1
and increase savings in the safe asset. Note
that the risky asset is inferior as well and thus an increase in the present value of endowment
income will reduce risk taking as well. A behavioral explanation is that the investor being
loss averse is trying to increase the second period consumption under the bad state to reduce
relative losses at the expense of reducing relative gains (in the first period and in the second
period under the good state of nature). This is materialized by allocating the increased
income into investment in the risk-free asset.
4.1.1 Capital income tax: Ambitious and relatively impatient investors
We again consider three cases. First, we assume that the first period consumption reference
level exceeds the first period endowment income of the investor and similarly, the second
period consumption reference level exceeds the second period endowment income. This is an
investor who is very ambitious in that not only the present value of endowment income is lower
than the present value of consumption reference levels but in every period the endowment
income is below its reference level.20 Second, consumption reference in the first period exceeds
income in the first period but consumption reference in the second period is below second
period endowment income while Y1 + Y2 < C¯1 + C¯2. We consider this investor to be more
ambitious in the first than second period. Third, consumption reference in the first period
is below the first period income but consumption reference in the second period exceeds the
income of that period while Y1+
Y2
1+rf
< C¯1+
C¯2
1+rf
. We consider this investor to be relatively
more ambitious in the second than in the first period. Without these conditions the results
are ambiguous in general.
4.1.2 Case 1: C¯1 > Y1 and C¯2 > Y2
Thus, if C¯1 > Y1 and C¯2 > Y2, an increase in capital income taxation will encourage current
consumption. There are two effects operating in the same direction. First, the effect of the
tax on (−Ω¯), keeping the marginal propensity to consume, MPC= 1
M¯(λ)
1+r¯f
−1
, constant. Second,
the effect of the tax on the MPC, while keeping Ω¯ constant. The increase in the tax increases
(−Ω¯) since C¯2 > Y2 (see (49)), and the investor reacts by increasing consumption in the first
20This conditions are sufficient for Ω¯ < 0 but not necessary.
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period. Based on (73), the tax also stimulates MPC, keeping Ω¯ constant, which reinforces the
former effect. Risk taking also increases, under these reference levels, due to full loss offset
provision and the stimulus in first period relative gains from the tax. Contrary to the first
case of a less ambitious investor, in this case there are no additional conditions on the tax rate
or on the risk aversion because the stimulus in first period gains offsets the potential reduction
arising from the impact of tax increase on the k¯1−τ term (see (13) and (52)). Furthermore, as
C¯1 > Y1 and investor is sufficiently loss averse then the increase in capital income tax reduces
second period consumption in the good state of nature, see (79), and increases consumption
in the bad state of nature.21 We thus observe substitution of second period consumption
away from the good state of nature towards the bad state of nature with an increase in the
tax. This is done to reduce the relative losses in the bad state of nature by sacrificing some
relative gains in the good state of nature given that loss aversion is present. The happiness
level (the value of the indirect utility) will increase with increasing capital income taxation as
the positive effect of current relative gains and reduction of relative losses in the bad state of
nature are stronger than the negative effect caused by decrease in relative gains in the good
state of nature. Finally the riskiness of future consumption decreases with increased taxation.
The summary is presented in the top part of Table 2 and differentiations of these results can
be found in the appendix, see (77)-(82).
4.1.3 Case 2: C¯1 > Y1 and Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 < C¯2 < Y2
When the relatively impatient, sufficiently loss averse and ambitious investor has its first
period reference consumption above its first period income and its second period reference
level below its endowment income in that period, then the impact of capital income taxation
is as follows. Consumption in the first period will increase for a relatively less risk averse
investor and decrease for more risk averse investor. As in the first case, consumption in the
good state will fall and increase in the bad state with the tax increase. Recall that this
investor is making relative losses in the bad state and relative gains in the good state. Hence
capital income taxation causes the investor to reduce gains in the good state in order to reduce
losses in the bad state of nature. Risk taking increases but the riskiness of future consumption
falls due to the increase in capital income taxation. In this case as in the previous case the
happiness level increases with capital income taxation. The summary can be found in the
middle part of Table 2.
21In the appendix it is shown, see (80), that relative gains in the second period are proportional to each
other: C∗2b − C¯2 = − (λK0)
1/γ
(
C∗2g − C¯2
)
. Thus, a reduction in C∗2g increases C
∗
2b and thus reduces losses in
the bad state of nature.
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4.1.4 Case 3: C¯1 < Y1 and C¯2 > Y2 + (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1)
In this final case the impact of an increase in capital income taxation is as follows. Current
consumption increases based on the same lines of arguments as in case 1, future consumption
in the good state increases as C¯1 < Y1, see (79), but decreases in the bad state which is the
opposite of the previous two cases. The investor thus increases gains in the second period in
the good state of nature by increasing losses in the bad state of nature. This is due to the
relatively high second period reference level and a relatively low first period reference level.
Both risk taking and the riskiness of future consumption (private risk taking) increase with an
increase in capital income taxation. As C¯1 < Y1, capital income taxation reduces happiness
level for sufficiently loss averse investor, see (81), which is in contrast to the previous two
cases discussed above. For the summary see the bottom part of Table 2.
Case 1 C¯1 ≥ Y1, C¯2 ≥ Y2 and C¯1 − Y1 + C¯2 − Y2 > 0
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dσC∗2 dS dE(U
∗)
dτ > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
Case 2 C¯1 > Y1 and Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 < C¯2 < Y2
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dσC∗2 dS dE(U
∗)
dτ ≷ 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 ≷ 0 > 0
> 0 > 0
when when
γ < γ4 γ > γ5
< 0 < 0
when when
γ > γ5 γ < γ4
Case 3 C¯1 < Y1 and C¯2 > (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dσC∗2 dS dE(U
∗)
dτ > 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0 < 0
Table 2: Sensitivity results with respect to τ for sufficiently loss averse more ambitious investor
with high time preference. Notation: γ4 and γ5 are given by (25) and (26). Note that γ4 < γ5.
4.2 More ambitious investors with a lower time preference
Here we explore a sufficiently loss averse investor who is not that impatient and thus has a
low rate of time preference as it relates to future utility of consumption. Namely, we assume
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that δ > δ¯.22 Based on Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017) the solution is as follows
C∗1 = C¯1 −
λ1/γ
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
(−Ω¯) (14)
α∗ =
1−K
1/γ
0
r¯f − r¯b +K
1/γ
0 (r¯g − r¯f )
×
λ¯1/γ
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
×
[
(1 + r¯f )(−Ω¯)
]
=
1−K
1/γ
0
r¯f − r¯b +K
1/γ
0 (r¯g − r¯f )
M¯
λ1/γ
(C¯1 − C
∗
1 ) (15)
where λ¯ =
(
M¯
1+r¯f
)γ
.23 In this case we find that the sufficiently loss averse investor will lower
the consumption in the first period below its reference level in order to have consumption
in the second period above the reference level in both states of nature (good and bad) as it
values future relatively more than the present and thus wants to avoid relative losses in the
second period. The investor will also invest in the risky asset. This type of investor sees first
period consumption as normal and not inferior. Normality is re-established just like in the
case of the less ambitious investor but an increase in the present value of endowment income
by one unit will increase first period consumption by more than one unit since the MPC
= λ
1/γ
λ1/γ−λ¯1/γ
> 1. This implies that savings will fall when the present value of endowment
income increases, i.e., savings become inferior.
Thus, the increase in investor’s endowment income is allocated such that relative losses
in the first period are reduced as much as possible (given investor’s aversion to losses) as well
as relative gains in the second period, see (14), (84) and (85). The increase in consumption
depends amongst other factors on the loss aversion parameter as well as on the capital income
tax rate. An increase in the capital income tax will reduce the increase in consumption from a
unit increase in the present value of endowment income (i.e., the MPC). Risk taking activity
will decrease with an increase in the present value of endowment income.
4.2.1 Capital income tax: Ambitious investors with a low time preference rate
Here again the same three cases are examined as with the ambitious investor with a higher
time preference rate.
4.2.2 Case 1: C¯1 > Y1 and C¯2 > Y2
In this case an increase in capital income taxation reduces current consumption and thus
current relative losses become larger. There are two opposing effects operating but one is more
powerful than the other, given the assumptions about the reference levels. First, the increase
in capital income tax reduces the marginal propensity to consume, keeping Ω¯ constant, which
22Note that this assumption is feasible, i.e., δ¯ < 1, if τ < τU , see (72) in the appendix.
23Note that an increase in the capital income tax will reduce λ¯, see (53) in the appendix.
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increases current consumption because Ω¯ < 0. Second, the tax reduces Ω¯, keeping MPC
constant, which reduces current consumption by a much larger amount resulting in an overall
reduction provided both reference levels are above their respective endowment income. The
impact of capital income taxation on risk taking is ambiguous. Risk taking is stimulated by
increased tax for sufficiently risk averse investor, namely when γ ≥
rf
1+rf
. On the other hand,
risk taking is discouraged by capital income tax when the tax rate does not exceed certain
threshold, namely τ < 1 − γ(1−2γ)rf . Note that this threshold is positive when the investor
is less risk averse, namely when γ <
rf
1+2rf
. Second period consumption is reduced in both
states of nature when tax increases. Given that the investor is making relative gains in the
second period, they are reduced with increasing tax rate (while given relative patience of
the investor the tax increases relative losses in the first period). Finally, the happiness level
decreases with increasing tax rate τ , as C¯2 > Y2 and investor is sufficiently loss averse, see
(92) and the riskiness of future consumption (private risk taking σC∗2 ) decreases with the tax
rate as well. The summary can be found in the top part of Table 3.
4.2.3 Case 2: C¯1 > Y1 and Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 < C¯2 < Y2
This relatively patient sufficiently loss averse investor with first period consumption reference
level exceeding the first period income and with a second period reference level being below the
second period income reacts to capital income taxation by increasing current consumption
(and thus decreasing savings) in contrast to the previous case where the investor reduced
current consumption. Thus, in this case the positive effect of the tax via the MPC is stronger
than the negative income effect. Risk taking impact is ambiguous. It is encouraged by the
tax when tax exceeds a certain threshold, while it is discouraged by the tax if the tax does
not exceed threshold 1 − γ(1−γ)rf and if investor is sufficiently risk averse. Expected indirect
utility increases which is driven by decreasing current relative losses and sufficient degree of
loss aversion.24 See the middle part of Table 3 for summary of the results.
4.2.4 Case 3: C¯1 < Y1 and C¯2 > Y2 + (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1)
This relatively patient sufficiently loss averse investor has its current reference level below
its first period income while its second period consumption target exceeds its corresponding
endowment income. Current consumption is reduced with the capital income tax increase as
in case 1 above making relative losses larger. Future consumption in the bad and good state
will increase (with increasing tax rate) when investor is relatively risk averse and this increases
the riskiness of future consumption as measured by the concept of private risk taking. The
tax increase is not sufficient to reduce riskiness of future consumption due to the increase in
consumption in both states of nature, good and bad. Risk taking also increases for relatively
24Sufficient degree of loss aversion and decreasing current relative losses overpower the decrease in future
relative gains. For more detail, see the appendix and (92).
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risk averse investors. On the other hand, future consumption as well as the private risk
decrease with increasing tax rate for less risk averse investors. Risk taking decreases as well
for relatively small tax rate and less risk averse investors. Finally, happiness falls with an
increase in the tax rate in this last case.
The summary of the sensitivity results can be found in Table 3 and the differentiation of
results is presented in the appendix, see (88)-(93).
Case 1 C¯1 > Y1 and C¯2 > Y2
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dσC∗2 dS dE(U
∗)
dτ < 0 < 0 < 0 ≷ 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
> 0
when
γ ≥
rf
1+rf
< 0
when
τ < τ¯5
γ <
rf
1+2rf
Case 2 C¯1 > Y1 and Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 < C¯2 < Y2
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dσC∗2 dS dE(U
∗)
dτ > 0 < 0 < 0 ≷ 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
> 0
when
τ > τ¯6
< 0
when
τ < τ¯
γ <
rf
1+rf
Case 3 C¯1 < Y1 and C¯2 > (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2
dC∗1 dC
∗
2g dC
∗
2b dα
∗ dσC∗2 dS dE(U
∗)
dτ < 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 ≷ 0 > 0 < 0
> 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
when when when when
γ > γ6 γ > γ6 γ ≥
rf
1+rf
γ > γ6
< 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
when when when when
γ < γ7 γ < γ7 τ < τ¯6 γ < γ7
γ < γ8
Table 3: Sensitivity results with respect to τ for sufficiently loss averse more ambitious investor
with low time preference. Notation: τ¯ , τ¯5, τ¯6, γ6, γ7, γ8 are given by (39), (44), (45), (27),
(28) and (29) in the glossary. Note that under assumptions of stated cases the following holds:
γ6 > γ7,
rf
1+rf
> γ8 and τ¯6 > τ¯ .
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4.3 Summary
If discount factor δ is such that δ ≤ δ¯(0) then only results presented in Table 2 apply.25 Note
that this condition is unbinding for sufficiently large p, namely
p ≥ 1−
[
rg − rf
(1 + rf )(rg − rb)
]1−γ
as then δ¯(0) ≥ 1. However, if p is sufficiently small, see condition (71), and thus δ¯(0) < 1,
and if in addition δ is such that δ > δ¯(0) then for sufficiently small τ is δ > δ¯(τ) and thus
results presented in Table 3 hold while for sufficiently large τ is δ ≤ δ¯(τ) and thus results
presented in Table 2 apply. If this is true (i.e., δ > δ¯(0)) then in case 1 (C¯1 > Y1 and C¯2 > Y2)
are current consumption, future consumption in the bad state of nature and the happiness
decreasing for smaller tax rate but increasing for larger tax rates. This could hold also for
investment in risky asset (when investor’s risk aversion is sufficiently small), i.e., risk taking
decreases with increasing τ and after τ exceeds its threshold then risk taking increases with
increasing tax rate. Future consumption in the good state of nature as well as the private
risk taking, are decreasing with increasing τ for all tax rates.
Regarding case 2 (C¯1 > Y1 and C¯2 < Y2), future consumption in the bad state of nature
again decreases with increasing τ for τ < τ˜ , where τ˜ is such that δ = δ¯(τ˜), and increases with
increasing τ when τ ≥ τ˜ . Different dynamics can occur also for current consumption which
at first increases with increasing tax rate and after the tax threshold is exceeded then the
current consumption can decrease (with increasing τ) when investor is sufficiently risk averse
(see the middle block of Table 2). In addition, if the investor is not too much risk averse
then the investment in the risky asset decreases at first (with increasing τ that is sufficiently
small) and then it increases when the tax rate exceeds its tax threshold. Future consumption
in the good state of nature and private risk taking are decreasing for all τ and the happiness
level increases for all τ .
In case 3 (C¯1 < Y1 and C¯2 > Y2) the results are the same as in case 1 for current
consumption and investment in the risky asset. Future consumption in the good state of
nature (as well as the private risk taking) is increasing with increasing tax rate for all τ if
investor is sufficiently risk averse. However, if investor is not too risk averse (see the last block
of Table 3) then the future consumption in the good state is discouraged by smaller tax rates
and then encouraged by larger tax rates (see Tables 2 and 3). Future consumption in the bad
state of nature is always discouraged by the tax if investor is not too risk averse. However,
if he/she is too risk averse, then the future consumption in the bad state is encouraged by
smaller tax rates and discouraged by larger tax rates. Finally, happiness level is discouraged
by tax rates for all levels of τ .
Note that while for smaller tax rates the future consumption under both states of nature
25As δ¯(τ ) is increasing in τ and thus δ < δ¯(τ ) for all range of the tax rate.
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responses in the same way (in terms of the direction) to the tax change, impact of the larger
tax rates on future consumption is opposite for the good state as for the bad state.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we conduct a positive analysis of the impact of capital income taxation, with full
loss offset provisions, on consumption, risk taking and the indirect utility function for different
types of sufficiently loss averse investors in a two period two asset portfolio savings model. The
impact of the tax is reference dependent and in relation to the investors endowment income.
For less ambitious investors, capital income taxation encourages current consumption in most
cases, and thus increases relative gains in the first period and reduces future consumption.
The increased relative gain in the first period increases the demand for the risky asset. Fur-
thermore, the risk taking adjustment under full loss offset (Domar-Musgrave phenomenon)
is also present as in expected utility models but because the return of the risk-free asset is
also taxed at the same rate as the risky asset, the adjustment is smaller which does not leave
private risk taking and expected utility unchanged as in Mossin (1968). The final outcome on
risk taking for less ambitious investors depends on the investor being relative risk averse, as
well as where the tax rate and the rate of time preference is in relation to certain thresholds.
Namely, capital income tax stimulates risk taking for a sufficiently high risk averse investor,
while it discourages risk taking when tax rate is below a certain threshold and if investor’s
degree of risk aversion is sufficiently low, and time preference sufficiently high.
More ambitious but sufficiently loss averse investors are affected differently by the tax.
Investors that are more ambitious but also relatively impatient due to the high rate of time
preference will increase risky investment with increased taxation. Current consumption is
discouraged for some types of ambitious investors that are relatively patient with a low rate
of time preference and have a relatively high second period reference levels but not necessary
first period reference level. For the latter type of investors risk taking can increase for relatively
risk averse investors similar to the less ambitious investors’ reaction to the tax. This research
shows that reference levels in relation to endowment income play the most significant role in
determining the outcome of capital income tax changes and should not be ignored. We also
find certain type of investors whose indirect utility function increases with capital income
taxation under full loss offset provisions.
Future research should examine the impact of capital income taxation on the investor’s
decisions under various assumptions regarding the way the risky tax revenue is handled by the
government and by also making the second period reference level endogenous as in Hlouskova
et al. (2019). One extreme way is to ignore the risky tax revenue to the public sector which is
assumed in the analysis of this paper. The other end of the spectrum is, for the government,
to return the tax revenue back to the investor in a lump sum stochastic form in which case
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the private sector absorbs all the risk (see Gordon, 1985; Bulow and Summers, 1984; Gordon
and Wilson, 1989; and Ahsan and Tsigaris, 2009). This transfer removes the income effect
of taxation and it also keeps the risk the investor faces the same as prior to the tax increase.
Removing the income effect of capital income taxation would allow one to examine the pure
substitution effect arising from changes in relative returns of the assets. Ahsan and Tsigaris
(2009) found that the effect of a capital income tax increase, on investors with expected utility
type of preferences under no risk sharing by the public sector, makes current consumption
more attractive on the margin and risk taking less attractive and that the tax transfer is not
sufficient to hold the investor on the same level of the utility as the pre-tax situation. This
negative reaction could be an explanation of the behavioural tax biases found in experimental
studies (Fochmann and Hemmerich, 2017). In this theoretical paper we do not incorporate
potential tax aversion effects (e.g. Kallbekken et al., 2011), tax affinity effects (e.g., Djanali
and Sheehan-Connor, 2012) nor tax salience effects (e.g., Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009)
which could impact the findings of this research.
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Appendix
Glossary
C¯L1 = Y1 +
1− γ
1 + γδ
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
(16)
C¯U1 = Y1 + (1− γ)(Y2 − C¯2) (17)
C¯L2 = Y2 +
(1− γ)M¯τ=0
γ + M¯τ=0
(Y1 − C¯1) (18)
C¯U2 =
(1− γ)M
γ(1 + rf ) +M
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 (19)
δ˜ =
rf − rb
rg − rb
1
p (1 + rf )
(20)
˜˜
δ =
1
M˜
[
1− 2γ
γ
rf − 1
]γ
(21)
γ1 =
rf (1 + rf )Ω
Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 − C¯2 + rf (1 + rf )Ω
(22)
γ2 =
rf
rf + (1 + rf )(1 + δ)
(23)
γ3 =
rfΩ
rfΩ+ (1 + δ)(Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 − C¯2)
(24)
γ4 = 1−
Y2 − C¯2
C¯1 − Y1
(25)
γ5 = 1−
Y2 − C¯2
(1 + rf )(C¯1 − Y1)
(26)
γ6 = 1−
Y1 − C¯1
C¯2 − Y2
(27)
γ7 = 1−
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1)
C¯2 − Y2
(28)
γ8 =
(C¯1 + C¯2 − Y1 − Y2)rf
(C¯1 + C¯2 − Y1 − Y2)(1 + rf ) + (C¯2 − Y2)rf
(29)
K0 =
(1− p)(rf − rb)
p (rg − rf )
(30)
Kγ =
(1− p)(rf − rb)
1−γ
p(rg − rf )1−γ
(31)
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k¯2 =
[
δ(1 + r¯f ) p
(
rg − rb
rf − rb
)1−γ] 1γ
(32)
k¯ =
[
δ(1 + r¯f ) (1− p)
(
rg − rb
rg − rf
)1−γ] 1γ
= k¯2K
1/γ
γ (33)
M =
[
δ(1 + rf ) p
rg − rb
rf − rb
] 1
γ rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
rg − rb
= k2
(
1 +K1/γγ
)
(34)
M¯ =
[
δ(1 + r¯f ) p
rg − rb
rf − rb
] 1
γ rf − rb +K
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
rg − rb
= k¯2
(
1 +K1/γγ
)
(35)
M¯(λ) =
[
δ(1 + r¯f ) p
rg − rb
rf − rb
] 1
γ (λK0)
1/γ (rg − rf )− (rf − rb)
rg − rb
= k¯
[
λ1/γ −
(
1
Kγ
)1/γ]
= k¯2
[
(λKγ)
1/γ − 1
]
(36)
M˜ = (1 + rf ) p
rg − rb
rf − rb
rf − rb +K 1γ0 (rg − rf )
rg − rb
γ (37)
Ω¯ = Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + r¯f
Ω = Y1 − C¯1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
(38)
τ¯ = 1−
γ
(1− γ)rf
(39)
τ¯1 = 1 +
1
rf
[
1−
1
δp
(
rf − rb
rg − rb
)1−γ (
Y2 − C¯2
Y1 − C¯1
1
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)γ]
(40)
τ¯2 = 1−
γ(1 +M)
(1− 2γ)rf
(41)
τ¯3 = 1−
γ[1 + δ(1 + rf )]
(1− 2γ)rf
(42)
τ¯4 = 1−
1
(1− 2γ)rf
[
γ(1 + δ(1 + rf )) +
(1− γ)r2f (C¯1 − Y1)
Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 − C¯2
]
(43)
τ¯5 = 1−
γ
(1− 2γ)rf
(44)
τ¯6 = 1−
γ(C¯1 + C¯2 − Y1 − Y2)
(1− 2γ)(C¯2 − Y2)− (1− γ)(Y1 − C¯1)
1
rf
(45)
Less ambitious investors
Note that sufficient conditions for Ω¯ ≥ 0 for all τ are: Y1 − C¯1 + Y2 − C¯2 ≥ 0 and C¯2 > Y2 or
Ω ≥ 0 and C¯2 < Y2.
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Let’s assume at first that Ω¯ ≥ 0 or (equivalently) that C¯1 ≤ Y1 +
Y2−C¯2
1+r¯f
. Then based on
Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017) the solution is given by (9) and (10). It can be shown
that
C∗2g − C¯2 =
rg − rb
rf − rb
k¯2
Ω¯
1 + M¯1+r¯f
=
rg − rb
rf − rb
k¯2
(
C∗1 − C¯1
)
(46)
C∗2b − C¯2 = K¯
1
γ
0
rg − rb
rf − rb
k¯2
Ω¯
1 + M¯1+r¯f
= K¯
1
γ
0
rg − rb
rf − rb
k¯2
(
C∗1 − C¯1
)
(47)
and
(1− γ)E (U (C∗1 , α
∗)) =
(
1 +
M¯
1 + r¯f
) Ω¯
1 + M¯1+r¯f
1−γ = (1 + M¯
1 + r¯f
)(
C∗1 − C¯1
)1−γ
= Ω¯1−γ
(
1 +
M¯
1 + r¯f
)γ
(48)
Note that the following holds
dΩ¯
dτ
=
rf
(1 + r¯f )2
(Y2 − C¯2)

> 0, for C¯2 < Y2
= 0, for C¯2 = Y2
< 0, for C¯2 > Y2
(49)
dk¯2
dτ
= −
rf
γ(1 + r¯f )
k¯2 < 0 (50)
dk¯
dτ
= −
rf
γ(1 + r¯f )
k¯ < 0
dM¯
dτ
= −
rf
γ(1 + r¯f )
M¯ < 0
d
(
M¯
1−τ
)
dτ
=
M¯
(1− τ)2
[
1−
r¯f
γ (1 + r¯f )
]{
< 0 for τ < τ¯
> 0 for τ > τ¯
(51)
d
(
k¯
1−τ
)
dτ
=
k¯
(1− τ)2
[
1−
r¯f
γ (1 + r¯f )
]
(52)
d
(
M¯
1+r¯f
)
dτ
=
dλ¯1/γ
dτ
= −
(1− γ)rfM¯
γ(1 + r¯f )2
= −
1− γ
γ
rf
1 + r¯f
λ¯1/γ < 0 (53)
d
(
k¯
1+r¯f
)
dτ
= −
(1− γ)rf k¯
γ(1 + r¯f )2
< 0
where τ¯ = 1− γ(1−γ)rf . For γ ≥
rf
1+rf
, i.e., for sufficiently risk averse investors, is τ¯ ≤ 0 and thus
condition τ > τ¯ is automatically satisfied. The inequalities in (51) hold under assumption
that rf > 0.
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After some derivations we obtain the following
dC∗1
dτ
=
rf
(1 + r¯f + M¯)2
[(
C¯1 − Y1 +
Ω¯
γ
)
M¯ + Y2 − C¯2
]
=
rf
γ(1 + r¯f )(1 + r¯f + M¯)2
{[
(1− γ)(1 + r¯f )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 − C¯2
]
M¯ + γ(1 + r¯f )(Y2 − C¯2)
}
=
rf
γ(1 + r¯f )(1 + r¯f + M¯)2
{
(1− γ)(1 + r¯f )(Y1 − C¯1)M¯ +
[
γ(1 + r¯f ) + M¯
]
(Y2 − C¯2)
}
(54)
dα∗
dτ
=
1− K¯
1
γ
0
rf − rb + K¯
1
γ
0 (rg − rf )
 d
dτ
(
M¯
1− τ
)
Ω¯
1 + M¯1+r¯f
+
M¯
1− τ
d
dτ
(
C∗1 − C¯1
)
=
α∗
1− τ
[
1−
r¯f
γ(1 + r¯f )
]
+
rfα
∗
(1 + r¯f + M¯)(1 + r¯f )Ω¯
[(
C¯1 − Y1 +
Ω¯
γ
)
M¯ + Y2 − C¯2
]
(55)
=
(
1− K¯
1/γ
0
)
M¯
γ(1− τ)
[
r¯f − r¯b + K¯
1/γ
0 (r¯g − r¯f )
] (
1 + r¯f + M¯
)2 ×
×
{[
γ(1 + r¯f + M¯)− (1− γ)r¯f (1 + r¯f )
]
(Y1 − C¯1)
+
[
γ(1 + r¯f + M¯)− (1− γ)r¯f
]
(Y2 − C¯2)
}
(56)
dC∗2g
dτ
=
d(C∗2g − C¯2)
dτ
=
rg − rb
rf − rb
[
dk¯2
τ
(
C∗1 − C¯1
)
+ k¯2
d(C∗1 − C¯1)
dτ
]
= −
rg − rb
rf − rb
×
rf k¯2
γ(1 + r¯f + M¯ )2
[
(1 + r¯f + γM¯)(Y1 − C¯1) + (1− γ)(Y2 − C¯2)
]
(57)
dC∗2b
dτ
=
d(C∗2b − C¯2)
dτ
= K
1/γ
0
dC∗2g
dτ
(58)
dE (U (C∗1 , α
∗))
dτ
=
rf
(1 + r¯f )1+γ(1 + r¯f + M¯)1−γΩ¯γ
[
−M¯(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 − C¯2
]
(59)
dσC∗2
dτ
= −
(
1− K¯
1/γ
0
)
r¯fM¯
γ(1− τ)
[
rf − rb +K
1/γ
0 (rg − rf )
] (
1 + r¯f + M¯
)2
×
[
(1 + r¯f + γM¯ )(Y1 − C¯1) + (1− γ)(Y2 − C¯2)
]
(60)
Note that (57), (58) and (60) imply that
dC∗2g
dτ ,
dC∗2b
dτ and
dσC∗
2
dτ will be of the same sign.
Let us assume at first that Y1 > C¯1 and Y2 > C¯2 (case 1). It follows then from (54),
(57) and (58) that
dC∗1
dτ > 0,
dC∗2g
dτ < 0 and
dC∗2b
dτ < 0. Equation (56) implies that sufficient
condition for dα
∗
dτ > 0 is when τ > τ¯ = 1−
γ
(1−γ)rf
.26 Note that for γ ≥
rf
1+rf
is τ¯ ≤ 0 and thus
26Based on (56) sufficient condition for α∗ to be increasing function in τ is that γ(1+r¯f )−(1−γ)r¯f (1+r¯f ) > 0.
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τ > τ¯ is automatically satisfied. This implies that for sufficiently risk-averse investors the
investment in the risky asset increases when capital income tax increases. For less risk-averse
investors, i.e., when γ <
rf
1+rf
, the investment in the risky asset increases with increasing
τ when τ exceeds its threshold value τ¯ . On the other hand, (56) implies that sufficient
condition for dα
∗
dτ < 0 is when τ < τ¯2 = 1−
γ(1+M)
(1−2γ)rf
.27 Note that τ¯2 > 0 when γ <
rf
1+2rf
and
δ <
˜˜
δ = 1
M˜
[
1−2γ
γ rf − 1
]γ
.
Note finally, that the following holds for E (U (C∗1 , α
∗))
dE (U (C∗1 , α
∗))
dτ

< 0 for τ < τ¯1
= 0 for τ = τ¯1
> 0 for τ > τ¯1
(61)
where τ¯1 = 1 +
1
rf
[
1− 1δp
(
rf−rb
rg−rb
)1−γ (
Y2−C¯2
Y1−C¯1
1
1+K
1/γ
γ
)γ]
. Thus, the indirect utility is de-
creasing (with increasing tax rate) when τ < τ¯1 and is increasing (with increasing τ) when
τ > τ¯1. Note that if τ¯1 < 0, which could happen for very small δ, i.e., in the case of high
time preference, then the indirect utility is increasing function of τ . The summary of results
on the sensitivity analysis can be found in Table 1.
Let us assume now that C¯2 > Y2 and Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 − C¯2 > 0 (case 3). Then (54) implies
that
dC∗1
dτ < 0 when
(1− γ)(1 + r¯f )(Y1 − C¯1)M¯ +
[
γ(1 + r¯f ) + M¯
]
(Y2 − C¯2) < 0
and thus when
(1− γ)M¯
γ(1 + r¯f ) + M¯
(1 + r¯f )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 < C¯2 < Y1 − C¯1 + Y2 (62)
Based on (53), sufficient condition for (62) becomes
C¯U2 =
(1− γ)M
γ(1 + rf ) +M
(1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 < C¯2 < Y1 − C¯1 + Y2 (63)
Note that condition (63) is feasible if rfM < γ(1+ rf )(1 +M) which holds for γ >
rf
1+rf
. On
the other hand,
dC∗1
dτ > 0 when
Y2 < C¯2 <
(1− γ)M¯
γ(1 + r¯f ) + M¯
(1 + r¯f )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2
27Based on (56) sufficient condition for α∗ to be decreasing function in τ is that γ(1+ r¯f+M)−(1−γ)r¯f < 0.
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sufficient condition for which is (when using (53))
Y2 < C¯2 <
(1− γ)M¯τ=0
γ + M¯τ=0
(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 = C¯
L
2
Note that for C¯1 < Y1 and C¯2 > Y2 the second period consumption remains decreasing
function in τ under both states of nature, as (1 + r¯f + γM¯)(Y1 − C¯1) + (1 − γ)(Y2 − C¯2) =
(1+ r¯f )(Y1−C¯1)+Y2−C¯2+γ
[
C¯2 − Y2 + M¯(Y1 − C¯1)
]
> 0 and thus based on (57) is
dC∗2b
dτ < 0
and
dC∗2g
dτ < 0. (59) implies that for C¯1 < Y1 and C¯2 > Y2 is the indirect utility (happiness)
decreasing function in τ . Finally, based on (56) it can be shown that the sufficient condition
for dα
∗
dτ > 0 is that γ >
rf (1+rf )Ω
Y1+Y2−C¯1−C¯2+rf (1+rf )Ω
= γ1 and that sufficient condition for
dα∗
dτ < 0
is that γ(1+ r¯f +M¯)−(1−γ)r¯f < 0. This can be achieved by assuming that δ <
rf−rb
rg−rb
1
p (1+rf )
(as then M¯ < δ(1 + rf )), τ < 1−
γ[1+δ(1+rf )]
(1−2γ)rf
= τ¯3 and γ < γ2 =
rf
rf+(1+rf )(1+δ)
.
Let C¯1 > Y1 and Ω > 0 (case 2). Then, based on (54), is
dC∗1
dτ > 0. In addition, (57)
implies also that
dC∗2g
dτ > 0 when
Y1 +
1− γ
1 + r¯f + γM¯
(Y2 − C¯2) < C¯1 < Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
(64)
Based on (64) the sufficient condition for
dC∗2g
dτ > 0, and thus also for
dC∗2b
dτ > 0 and
dσC∗
2
dτ > 0,
is
C¯U1 = Y1 + (1− γ)(Y2 − C¯2) < C¯1 < Y1 +
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
and γ >
rf
1 + rf
(65)
On the other hand,
dC∗2g
dτ < 0 when
C¯1 < Y1 +
1− γ
1 + r¯f + γM¯
(Y2 − C¯2) (66)
Based on (66) sufficient condition for
dC∗2g
dτ < 0, and thus also for
dC∗2b
dτ < 0 and
dσC∗
2
dτ < 0, is
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C¯1 < C¯
L
1 = Y1 +
1− γ
1 + γδ
Y2 − C¯2
1 + rf
and δ < δ˜ =
rf − rb
rg − rb
1
p (1 + rf )
(67)
(56) implies that dα
∗
dτ > 0 when[
γ(1 + r¯f + M¯)− (1− γ)r¯f
]
(Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 − C¯2) + (1− γ)r¯
2
f (C¯1 − Y1) > 0 (68)
Sufficient condition for (68) is γ(1 + r¯f + M¯)− (1− γ)r¯f ≥ 0 which holds for sufficiently risk
28Note that δ˜, as defined in (67), was determined such that δ(1 + rf )p
rg−rb
rf−rb
< 1, see (34), and thus
M¯ < M < δ(1 + rf ).
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averse investors, namely when γ ≥
rf
1+2rf
. On the other hand (56) also implies that dα
∗
dτ < 0
when
[
γ(1 + r¯f + M¯)− (1− γ)r¯f
]
(Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 − C¯2) + (1− γ)r¯
2
f (C¯1 − Y1) < 0 (69)
Note that M¯ < δ(1 + rf ) when δ < δ˜ =
rf−rb
rg−rb
1
p (1+rf )
, which implies that sufficient condition
for (69) is
(1− γ)r2f (C¯1 − Y1)
Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 − C¯2
< (1− 2γ)(1 − τ)rf − γ[1 + δ(1 + rf )]
which, for γ < 0.5, boils down to
τ < 1−
1
(1− 2γ)rf
[
γ(1 + δ(1 + rf )) +
(1− γ)r2f (C¯1 − Y1)
Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 − C¯2
]
= τ¯4 (70)
Note in addition that τ¯4 > 0 for γ <
rfΩ
rfΩ+(1+δ)(Y1+Y2−C¯1−C¯2)
= γ3.
More ambitious investors
We assume that λ is sufficiently large29 and that Ω¯ < 0 or (equivalently) that C¯1 > Y1+
Y2−C¯2
1+r¯f
.
Let introduce the following notation We refer to the investor with these specifications and
δ ≤ δ¯, where δ¯ is given by (11), as the more ambitious investor with a higher time preference.
On the other hand, if δ > δ¯ while everything else is kept unchanged, then we refer to this
investor as the investor with lower time preference. Note however that threshold value for δ,
δ¯, is an increasing function in τ where δ¯min = δ¯(0) =
1
1−p
[
rg−rf
(1+rf )(rg−rb)
]1−γ
is its minimum
value. Thus, if δ ≤ δ¯min then the investor will be of this type (i.e., investor with a higher time
preference) for any tax rate τ . If, however, δ exceeds this threshold, i.e., δ > δ¯min, and thus
if δ¯min < 1, which holds for sufficiently small p such that
rf − rb
rg − rb
< p < 1−
[
rg − rf
(1 + rf )(rg − rb)
]1−γ
(71)
where the lower bound follows from E(r) > rf ,
30 then this investor is at first the investor with
lower time preference for all tax rates such that τ ∈ (0, τ˜ ), where δ = δ¯(τ˜ ), as then δ > δ¯(τ).
When τ exceeds τ˜ , i.e., when τ ∈ [τ˜ , 1), then the investor becomes the investor with higher
time preference as then δ ≤ δ¯(τ).
Note that the case of the investor with lower time preference; i.e., when δ > δ¯, is feasible
29For more details regarding the assumption on loss aversion, see Proposition 3 in Hlouskova, Fortin and
Tsigaris (2017).
30Note finally that upper bound of p in (71) exceeds its lower bound when following holds: rg >
rf (1+rf )
1
γ
−1
(1+rf )
1
γ
−1
−1
and rb > rg − (1 + rf )
1
γ (rg − rf ).
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only when δ¯(τ) = 11−p
[
rg−rf
(1+r¯f )(rg−rb)
]1−γ
< 1 which holds if
τ <
1
rf
[
1 + rf −
rg − rf
(1− p)
1
1−γ (rg − rb)
]
= τU (72)
and thus if τU > 0. The last inequality is guaranteed if probability p of the good state is
sufficiently small such that condition (71) is satisfied. Note that condition E(r) > rf , i.e.,
that p >
rf−rb
rg−rb
, implies that τU < 1. Thus, based on this, is δ < 1 ≤ δ¯(τ) for τ ≥ τU and the
investor behaves as the investor with the higher time preference.
More ambitious investors with a higher time preference
We assume that δ ≤ δ¯. Then the following holds
γ
dM¯(λ)
dτ
= −
rf
1 + r¯f
M¯(λ) < 0
d
dτ
M¯ (λ)
1 + r¯f
= −
1− γ
γ
rf
(1 + r¯f )2
M¯(λ) < 0 (73)
where M¯(λ) is given by (36).
Based on Hlouskova, Fortin and Tsigaris (2017), the solution for sufficiently loss averse
investor is given as by (12) and (13) and
C∗2g − C¯2 =
rg − rb
rg − rf
k¯(−Ω¯)
M¯(λ)
1+r¯f
− 1
(
1
K0
) 1
γ
(74)
C¯2 −C
∗
2b =
rg − rb
rg − rf
k¯(−Ω¯)
M¯(λ)
1+r¯f
− 1
λ
1
γ = (λK0)
1/γ (C∗2g − C¯2) (75)
Note in addition that
(1− γ)E (U (C∗1 , α
∗)) =
 −Ω¯
M¯(λ)
1+r¯f
− 1
1−γ [1 + k¯
1 + r¯f
((
1
Kγ
) 1
γ
− λ
1
γ
)]
= −(−Ω¯)1−γ
[
M¯(λ)
1 + r¯f
− 1
]γ
(76)
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The following holds
dC∗1
dτ
=
rf
γ(1 + r¯f )[M¯ (λ)− 1− r¯f ]2
{[
(1− γ)(1 + r¯f )(C¯1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2
]
M¯(λ)
+γ(1 + r¯f )(Y2 − C¯2)
}
=
rf
γ(1 + r¯f )[M¯ (λ)− 1− r¯f ]2
{
(1− γ)(1 + r¯f )(C¯1 − Y1)M¯(λ)
+
[
M¯(λ)− γ(1 + r¯f )
]
(C¯2 − Y2)
}
(77)
dα∗
dτ
=
(
1
K¯0
)1/γ
+ λ1/γ
rg − rf
 d
dτ
(
k¯
1− τ
)
−Ω¯
M¯(λ)
1+r¯f
− 1
+
k¯
1− τ
d
dτ
(
C∗1 − C¯1
)
=
[(
1
K¯0
)1/γ
+ λ1/γ
]
k¯
γ(1− τ)(r¯g − r¯f )
[
M¯(λ)− 1− r¯f
]2 ×
×
{[
γ(M¯(λ)− 1− r¯f ) + (1− γ)r¯f (1 + r¯f )
]
(C¯1 − Y1)
+
[
γ(M¯(λ)− 1− r¯f ) + (1− γ)r¯f
]
(C¯2 − Y2)
}
(78)
dC∗2g
dτ
=
d
(
C∗2g − C¯2
)
dτ
=
rg − rb
rf − rb
1
K
1/γ
0
[
dk¯
τ
(
C∗1 − C¯1
)
+ k¯
dC∗1 − C¯1
dτ
]
= −
rg − rb
rf − rb
(
1
K0
)1/γ rf k¯
γ
[
M¯(λ)− 1− r¯f
]2
×
[
(γM¯ (λ)− 1− r¯f )(C¯1 − Y1)− (1− γ)(C¯2 − Y2)
]
(79)
dC∗2b
dτ
= −
d
(
C¯2 − C
∗
2b
)
dτ
= − (K0λ)
1/γ dC
∗
2g
dτ
(80)
dE (U (C∗1 , α
∗))
dτ
=
rf
(1 + r¯f )1+γ
[
M¯(λ)− 1− r¯f
]1−γ
Ω¯γ
[
M¯(λ)(C¯1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2
]
(81)
dσC∗2
dτ
= −
[(
1
K0
)1/γ
+ λ1/γ
]
r¯f k¯
γ(1− τ)(rg − rf )
[
M¯(λ)− 1− r¯f
]2 ×
×
[(
γM¯(λ)− 1− r¯f
)
(C¯1 − Y1)− (1− γ)(C¯2 − Y2)
]
(82)
37
(79), (80) and (82) imply that
dC∗2g
dτ and
dσC∗2
dτ will be of the same sign which will be opposite
to the sign of
dC∗2b
dτ .
Let C¯1 > Y1 and C¯2 > Y2 (case 1) and the investor is sufficiently loss averse. Then the
following holds based on (77)–(82):
dC∗1
dτ > 0,
dα∗
dτ > 0,
dC∗2g
dτ < 0,
dC∗2b
dτ > 0,
dE(U(C∗1 ,α∗))
dτ > 0
and
dσC∗2
dτ < 0. The summary of results on the sensitivity analysis can be found in Table 2.
Let C¯1 > Y1, Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 < C¯2 < Y2 (case 2) and the investor is sufficiently loss averse.
Then (77) implies that
dC∗1
dτ < 0 when
(1− γ)(1 + r¯f )(C¯1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2 < 0
and thus when
τ > 1 +
(1− γ)(C¯1 − Y1) + C¯2 − Y2
(1− γ)rf (C¯1 − Y1)
= τ5 (83)
Note that τ is feasible, i.e., τ5 < 1, when γ > 1 −
Y2−C¯2
C¯1−Y1
= γ4. In addition for γ > 1 −
Y2−C¯2
(1+rf )(C¯1−Y1)
= γ5 is τ5 < 0 and thus γ > γ5 is a sufficient condition for
dC∗1
dτ < 0 (when
investor is sufficiently loss averse). On the other hand,
dC∗1
dτ > 0 when τ < τ5 and γ < γ5 (so
that τ is feasible). Finally γ < γ4 is a sufficient condition for
dC∗1
dτ > 0. Regarding the risk
taking, (78) implies that it increases with increasing τ , i.e., dα
∗
dτ > 0. (79)–(82) imply that
dC∗2g
dτ < 0,
dσC∗2
dτ < 0,
dC∗2b
dτ > 0 and
dE(U(C∗1 ,α∗))
dτ > 0 for sufficiently loss averse investor.
Let C¯1 < Y1, C¯2 > (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 (case 3) and the investor is sufficiently loss
averse. Then (77)–(82) imply that
dC∗1
dτ > 0,
dα∗
dτ > 0. (79)–(82) imply that
dC∗2g
dτ > 0,
dσC∗
2
dτ > 0,
dC∗2b
dτ < 0 and
dE(U(C∗1 ,α∗))
dτ < 0 for sufficiently loss averse investor.
More ambitious investors with a lower time preference
Now we assume that δ > 11−p
[
rg−rf
(1+r¯f )(rg−rb)
]1−γ
= δ¯. Based on (Hlouskova, Fortin and
Tsigaris, 2017) the solution is given by (14) and (15) and
C∗2g − C¯2 =
(1 + r¯f ) (−Ω¯) λ¯
1/γ
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
(
1 +
rg − rf
rf − rb
1−K
1/γ
0
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
(84)
C∗2b − C¯2 =
(1 + r¯f ) (−Ω¯) λ¯
1/γ
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
×
K
1/γ
γ +K
1/γ
0
1 +K
1/γ
γ
(85)
(1− γ)E (U (C∗1 , α
∗)) = −
(
−Ω¯
)1−γ (λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
1 + r¯f
)γ
(86)
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where
λ¯ =
(
M¯
1 + r¯f
)γ
(87)
The following holds
dC∗1
dτ
=
rf
γ(1 + r¯f )2
λ1/γ(
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)2
×
{[
(1− γ)(C¯1 − Y1) +
C¯2 − Y2
1 + r¯f
]
M¯ − γ(C¯2 − Y2)λ
1/γ
}
(88)
dα∗
dτ
=
1−K
1/γ
0
rf − rb +K
1/γ
0 (rg − rf )
×
1
λ1/γ
×
d
dτ
[
M¯
1− τ
(
C¯1 − C
∗
1
)]
=
1−K
1/γ
0
rf − rb +K
1/γ
0 (rg − rf )
×
1
λ1/γ
×
[(
d
dτ
M¯
1− τ
)(
C¯1 −C
∗
1
)
+
M¯
1− τ
d(C¯1 − C
∗
1 )
dτ
]
=
(
1−K
1/γ
0
)
λ¯1/γ
γ(rf − rb)
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
(1− τ)2(1 + r¯f )
[
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
]2
×
{
[γ(1 + r¯f )− r¯f ](1 + r¯f )(−Ω¯)
(
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)
+ γr¯f (C¯2 − Y2)
(
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)
−(1− γ)r¯f (1 + r¯f )(−Ω¯)λ¯
1/γ
}
(89)
dC∗2g
dτ
= −
rf λ¯
1/γ
γ
(
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)2
(
1 +
rg − rf
rf − rb
×
1−K
1/γ
0
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
×
{[
C¯1 − Y1 +
1− γ
1 + r¯f
(C¯2 − Y2)
] (
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)
− (1− γ) Ω¯ λ¯1/γ
}
(90)
dC∗2b
dτ
= −
rf λ¯
1/γ
γ
(
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)2 × K1/γγ +K1/γ0
1 +K
1/γ
γ
×
[
(C¯1 − Y1)
(
λ1/γ − γλ¯1/γ
)
+
(1− γ)(C¯2 − Y2)
1 + r¯f
λ1/γ
]
= −
rf λ¯
1/γ
γ
(
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)2 × K1/γγ +K1/γ0
1 +K
1/γ
γ
×
{[
C¯1 − Y1 +
1− γ
1 + r¯f
(C¯2 − Y2)
] (
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)
− (1− γ) Ω¯ λ¯1/γ
}
(91)
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dE (U (C∗1 , α
∗))
dτ
=
−rf
(1 + r¯f )2
(
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)1−γ
Ω¯γ
[
(1 + r¯f )(C¯1 − Y1) λ¯
1/γ + (C¯2 − Y2)λ
1/γ
]
(92)
dσC∗2
dτ
= −
(
1−K
1/γ
0
)
r¯f λ¯
1/γ
γ(rf − rb)
(
1 +K
1/γ
γ
)
(1− τ)(1 + r¯f )
(
λ1/γ − λ¯1/γ
)2
×
[
(1 + r¯f )(C¯1 − Y1)
(
λ1/γ − γλ¯1/γ
)
+ (1− γ)(C¯2 − Y2)λ
1/γ
]
(93)
(90), (91) and (93) imply that
dC∗2g
dτ ,
dC∗2b
dτ and
dσC∗
2
dτ will be of the same sign.
Note from (88) that for sufficiently loss averse investor and C¯2 > Y2 is
dC∗1
dτ < 0 while
dC∗1
dτ > 0 for C¯2 < Y2. Equation (90) implies that
dC∗2g
dτ < 0, and thus also
dC∗2b
dτ < 0 and
dσC∗
2
dτ < 0, when
(1 + r¯f )(C¯1 − Y1) + (1− γ)(C¯2 − Y2) > 0 (94)
and thus when
−(1 + r¯f ) Ω¯ > γ (C¯2 − Y2)
The above inequalities hold for C¯1 > Y1 and C¯2 > Y2, or when C¯2 < Y2 and C¯1+C¯2−Y1−Y2 >
0. Let C¯1 < Y1, C¯2 > (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 and the investor is sufficiently loss averse. Then
(90) implies that
dC∗2g
dτ < 0, when inequality (94) is satisfied, and thus when
τ > 1−
C¯1 − Y1 + (1− γ)(C¯2 − Y2)
rf (Y1 − C¯1)
= τ6 (95)
Note that τ is feasible, i.e., τ6 < 1, when γ < 1 −
Y1−C¯1
C¯2−Y2
= γ6. In addition for γ < 1 −
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)
C¯2−Y2
= γ7 is τ6 < 0 and thus γ < γ7 is a sufficient condition for
dC∗2g
dτ < 0 (when
investor is sufficiently loss averse). On the other hand,
dC∗2g
dτ > 0 when τ < τ6 and γ > γ7 (so
that τ is feasible). Finally, γ > γ6 is a sufficient condition for
dC∗2g
dτ > 0.
(92) implies that the indirect utility (happiness) is a decreasing function in τ for C¯1 > Y1
and C¯2 > Y2 or when C¯1 < Y1, C¯2 > (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2 and the investor is sufficiently
loss averse, namely λ >
[
(1+rf )(Y1−C¯1)
C¯2−Y2
]γ
λ¯ = λ¯1. On the other hand the investor’s happiness
is an increasing function in τ when C¯1 > Y1, Y1 + Y2 − C¯1 < C¯2 < Y2 and λ > λ¯1.
Finally, (89) implies that investment in the risky asset is an increasing function in τ ,
dα∗
dτ > 0, for sufficiently loss averse investor if
γ(1 + r¯f )− r¯f > 0 (96)
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and C¯1 > Y1 and C¯2 > Y2, or if (96) holds and C¯1 < Y1, C¯2 > (1 + rf )(Y1 − C¯1) + Y2.
Sufficiently condition for (96) is γ ≥
rf
1+rf
. Sufficient condition for dα
∗
dτ < 0 when C¯1 > Y1
and C¯2 > Y2 is γ(1 + r¯f ) − (1 − γ)r¯f < 0, see (89), which is true for τ < 1 −
γ
(1−2γ)rf
. This
condition is feasible for γ <
rf
1+2rf
. On the other hand, sufficient condition for dα
∗
dτ < 0 when
C¯1 < Y1 and Ω < 0 follows from
[γ − r¯f (1− γ)](C¯1 + C¯2 − Y1 − Y2) + γ r¯f (C¯2 − Y2) < 0 (97)
assuming that τ and γ are sufficiently small.31 Note that for sufficiently small γ is (97)
satisfied for
τ < 1−
γ (C¯1 + C¯2 − Y1 − Y2)
(1− 2γ)(C¯2 − Y2)− (1− γ)(Y1 − C¯1)
1
rf
= τ¯6
The feasibility is guaranteed by assuming
γ <
(C¯1 + C¯2 − Y1 − Y2)rf
(C¯1 + C¯2 − Y1 − Y2)(1 + rf ) + (C¯2 − Y2)rf
= γ8
If, however, C¯2 < Y2 and C¯1 + C¯2 − Y1 − Y2 > 0, then based on (89) is
dα∗
dτ < 0 when
γ(1 + r¯f ) − r¯f < 0, which holds for τ < 1 −
γ
(1−γ)rf
= τ¯ and γ <
rf
1+rf
. Sufficient condition
for dα
∗
dτ > 0, when C¯2 < Y2 and C¯1 + C¯2 − Y1 − Y2 > 0, is τ > τ¯6.
31Namely τ < 1− γ
(1−γ)rf
and γ <
rf
1+rf
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